University of St. Thomas Law Journal
Volume 6
Issue 2 Winter 2009

Article 13

2009

Marriage in Its Procreative Dimension: The
Meaning of the Institution of Marriage Throughout
the Ages
Charles J. Reid Jr.
University of St. Thomas School of Law, cjreid@stthomas.edu

Bluebook Citation
Charles J. Reid, Jr., Marriage in Its Procreative Dimension: The Meaning of the Institution of Marriage Throughout the Ages, 6 U. St. Thomas
L.J. 454 (2009).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UST Research Online and the University of St. Thomas Law Journal. For more information,
please contact lawjournal@stthomas.edu.

\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-2\UST212.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

7-AUG-09

16:04

ARTICLE

MARRIAGE IN ITS PROCREATIVE
DIMENSION: THE MEANING OF THE
INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE THROUGHOUT
THE AGES*
DR. CHARLES J. REID, JR.**
The word “institution” is one of those open-ended words that could
mean many things to many different audiences. I intend to use the word in
much the same manner as it has been employed by Douglass North in his
studies of Western economic history. Institutions, North has written, define
“the rules of the game; . . . they structure incentives in exchange, whether
political, social, or economic.”1 Institutions, in other words, embrace rules
of law and other norms governing human interaction. They help us to channel human behavior in certain ways and not in others. Necessarily, they also
embrace the belief systems that stand behind and animate the rules. They
help to define social expectations and to set standards.
I shall take the position that the institutional weight of marriage, for
most of the last two thousand years, has been in favor of seeing marriage as
the appropriate vehicle in which to give birth to and raise children. The
procreative dimension of marriage has been the central core organizing
principle of the institutional—that is, the legal—understanding of marriage
from the time of pre-Christian Roman law to the present, although it is
currently endangered by various shifts in legal norms and public philosophies. But, for most of its history, it can fairly be said that the legal order of
the West has dedicated itself, through a variety of rules and understandings,
incentives and disincentives, to preserving marriage as a principal means of
bringing into being the next generation. To have made this sort of claim
even as recently as two or three decades ago might have appeared as stating
*
held in
**
1.

An earlier version of this article was presented at a conference on family law and policy
Banff National Park, Alberta.
Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minn.).
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Ideology, and Economic Performance, in THE REVOLUTION IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 95 (James A. Dorn, Steve H. Hanke & Alan A. Walters eds.,
1989).
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the obvious. But in light of recent arguments about the nature and function
of marriage—recently accepted by courts in the United States and Canada—reviewing the history of the procreative dimension of marriage
seems like a worthwhile undertaking.
In this paper, I shall consider four societies that have existed over the
course of western history. These include pre-Christian classical Rome, the
early medieval West of the sixth through eleventh centuries, the High Middle Ages of the twelfth through fifteenth centuries, and the Anglican high
church and theological culture of the early modern period. There is, in each
of these societies, a great emphasis placed on marriage as the legitimate
means of bringing into being the next generation. Indeed, the procreative
dimension of marriage was, in each of these societies, the central organizing
principle of legal analysis and social life.
I. PRE-CHRISTIAN ROMAN LAW
Let us begin with pre-Christian Roman law. The popular opinion,
shaped probably by pulp novels and television and film representation,
would have one believe that the Romans did not hold marriage in high
regard. The morals of Petronius and Nero are likely what most people
would think of should they be asked to focus on pre-Christian Roman sexual behaviors and expectations. The law, however, did not reflect or condone this code of conduct. There were steady efforts by lawmakers to
provide institutional support for marriage and to recognize marriage as the
means by which the next generation should come into being and be trained
to accept its responsibilities.
We might consider the Augustan marriage reforms. Emperor Octavian,
who took the name “Augustus”—“the Great” or “the Exalted One”—sought
to restore order to a Roman Empire that had experienced decades of turmoil.2 He understood marriage to be under grave threat in his day (he
reigned from 31 BC to AD 14), and was especially concerned with the
failure of the Roman elites to have children and thus to produce the next
generation of leading citizens. Rome, in the century before Augustus ascended to the imperial throne, had undergone wrenching social and economic change. Over the course of one hundred years, Rome expanded its
imperial reach over large parts of the Mediterranean basin and also over
areas of the far North—northern Gaul and even Britain. Rome had also
undergone a series of bloody civil wars. The old republican forms of government lost their real significance and were replaced by the principate—
government by an emperor who preserved, on behalf of the elites, the old
republican titles but who ruled on his own accord. In the course of these
2. One of Augustus’s most recent English-language biographers begins by describing him,
then Octavian, as “[t]he man who can justifiably be called the founder of the Roman Empire.” PAT
SOUTHERN, AUGUSTUS 1 (1998).
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upheavals, the elites stopped having children. Indeed, one sees the emergence in the course of the first century BC of a kind of contraceptive
mentality that favored present-centered hedonism over the foresight and
sacrifice that fecund married life necessarily entailed.3
Augustus sought to counter these trends and to encourage the growth
and fostering of families through a series of inducements and penalties.4 At
least two laws were promulgated, one in 17 BC known as the Lex Iulia de
Maritandis Ordinibus and the other in AD 9 known as the Lex Iulia et
Papia Poppaea. Taken as a whole, this legislation is commonly known today as the Lex Papia Poppaea after the names of the men who were counsels at the time of the latter law’s promulgation. The texts survive only in
partial and derivative form, culled from a variety of ancient sources.5
The Hungarian scholar Pál Csillag has painstakingly identified the basic categories of thought behind this legislation. Csillag notes that the law
divided all men between roughly the ages of twenty-five and sixty and all
women between roughly the ages of twenty and fifty into two basic types—
the married and the celibate (caelibes).6 The law expected all those who fell
between the specified age limitations to marry or to face certain penalties,
chief among them being the loss of the capacity to inherit.7 By marrying
within one hundred days of receiving notice of a bequest, however, a celibate man or woman might remove the incapacity imposed by the statute.8
Failure to comply caused the gift to lapse and to become the property of the
state.9 Orbi—childless couples10—were permitted to take one-half of the
3. The ancient writer Aulus Gellius recorded a speech delivered by a public censor, Metellus Numidicus, around the year 102 BC on the necessity of marriage. Metellus warned his audience that “it was impossible for the City to survive without frequent marriage” (“civitatem salvam
esse sine matrimoniorum frequentia non posse”). AULUS GELLIUS, NOCTES ATTICAE, bk. I, VI.6.
Suetonius records that Augustus used this speech, or one like it, in his own arguments before the
Senate when seeking approval for his marriage legislation; the title of the speech was “De Prole
Augenda” (“On the Increase of Children”). C. SUETONI TRANQUILLI, DIVUS AUGUSTUS 89.2
(1979).
4. The idea of legislative reform of morals and marriage was something that was current in
late Republican thought. Thus, Karl Galinsky calls attention to Cicero’s efforts to encourage Julius
Caesar to embark upon a similar program. See Karl Galinsky, Augustus’ Legislation on Morals
and Marriage, 125 PHILOLOGUS 126, 132 (1981). There is also indirect evidence that Augustus
may have commenced his legislative activity almost as soon as he became princeps, prior to the
year 27 BC. See PETER BRUNT, ITALIAN MANPOWER 225 B.C.–A.D. 14, at 558 (1971).
5. The best source for these documents remains SALVATORE RICCOBONO, JR., 1 ACTA DIVI
AUGUSTI 166–97 (1945).
6. PÁL CSILLAG, THE AUGUSTAN LAWS ON FAMILY RELATIONS 81–82 (1976).
7. Gaius’s Institutes obliquely preserves the legislation on the incapacity of caelibes to take
under a will when it acknowledges an exception for soldiers’ wills: “Celibates . . . are forbidden to
take an inheritance and legacies by the lex Iulia . . . .” (“Caelibes . . . lege Iulia hereditates
legataque capere uetantur . . . .”). GAIUS, INSTITUTES, bk. II, 111.
8. CSILLAG, supra note 6, at 86.
9. Id.
10. Orbi (masculine singular orbus) is a richly nuanced word that carries with it the sense of
both deprivation and barrenness. It may mean a parent who has lost a child, a child who has lost
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estates bequeathed to them.11 Those who failed to marry or to reproduce
might incur still other civil penalties, including the loss of political office.12
In practice, the harshness of the law was mitigated by juristic commentary
which taught that “inheritance from ascendants or descendants within three
degrees was excepted.”13
The ancient historians noted that Augustus’s legislation enjoyed at best
a mixed reception. Suetonius recorded that Augustus’s marriage legislation
was met with a “tumult of refusal” (tumultu recusantium) at the time of its
promulgation and was accordingly “softened” (lenita).14 Tacitus indicated
that Augustus intended to rely on a general public duty to report those who
might have received suspicious inheritances. As a practical matter, this enforcement mechanism evolved into a system of informers-for-profit that
grew to be intensely disliked by the general population because, if the commentators are to be believed, it was a thoroughly corrupt process.15
While Augustus’s approach emphasized penalties, subsequent emperors stressed inducements. Again, the law of succession proved the vehicle
by which childbirth was encouraged. By a decree of the second-century
emperor Hadrian, freeborn mothers of three children and freedwomen
mothers of four children received the preferential right to inherit from children who predeceased them even where the children were in the power of a
relative—including the father.16 This rule represented a notable exception
to the legally dominant position the father occupied in the Roman household.17 Further, the Emperor Septimius Severus, around the year 203, decreed “that one may be excused from the onerous duty of being a guardian
or curator by having a certain number of children: three in Rome, four in
the rest of Italy, five in the provinces.”18
Philosophers lent much-needed intellectual support to the proclaimed
policy objectives of the Roman law. One might consider the teaching of
Musonius Rufus, a Stoic philosopher who wrote in the latter half of the first
century AD. Musonius understood marriage to serve two fundamental
his or her parents, those unable to reproduce, or those left alone and desolate in the world. See
OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 1264–65 (1982).
11. CSILLAG, supra note 6, at 85.
12. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT BY THE CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS 21 (1965).
13. Id.; see also Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, Family and Inheritance in the Augustan Marriage
Laws, PROC. OF THE CAMBRIDGE PHILOLOGICAL SOC’Y 58 (1981) (exploring the implications of
the Augustan legislation for families and estate planning).
14. C. SUETONI TRANQUILLI, supra note 3, at 34.
15. TACITUS, ANNALES 3.28; see also CSILLAG, supra note 6, at 163–64 (reviewing Tacitus
and other sources).
16. GAIUS, supra note 7, at 3.3.2.
17. See CHARLES J. REID, JR., POWER OVER THE BODY, EQUALITY IN THE FAMILY: RIGHTS
AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 69–72 (2004) (describing the scope and
nature of the Roman legal doctrine of paternal power).
18. NOONAN, supra note 12, at 23 (summarizing CODEX 5.66.1).
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goals—the procreation of children and the formation of a union that reflected the most intimate sorts of friendship and love. In this context,
Musonius asserted, marriage was a coming together by husband and wife
for the purposes of rearing the next generation. Such a goal, he asserted,
was best achieved in a family filled with mutual love:
The husband and wife . . . should come together for the purpose
of making a life in common and of procreating children, and furthermore of regarding all things in common between them, and
nothing peculiar or private to one or the other, not even their own
bodies. The birth of a human being which results from such a
union is to be sure something marvelous, but it is not yet enough
for the relation of husband and wife, inasmuch as quite apart from
marriage it could result from any other sexual union, just as in the
case of animals. But in marriage there must be above all perfect
companionship and mutual love of husband and wife, both in
health and in sickness and under all conditions, since it was with
this desire as well as for having children that both entered upon
marriage.19
The procreative and companionate ideals embodied in these legislative
enactments and reflected in the writings of philosophers like Musonius Rufus, although resisted by some among the elites, must have had an effect. A
review of recent scholarship, not on Roman marriage but on Roman concubinage, reveals that Roman social practice recognized that marriage, where
it was available, should serve as the legitimate means of procreation.
In Roman practice, concubinage often involved a relationship of unequals; it might thus involve men too young for marriage but who lived for a
while with a partner of lesser social status, as St. Augustine recorded he
personally did in his Confessions.20 It might also involve older men, whose
wives had died and whose children were grown, living with women of unequal status. Finally, it might involve relationships where one party was forbidden by law to marry—for instance, where one party was a slave or of
servile birth.21 What is significant, according to scholars who have studied
the evidence of inscriptions, is how rarely children are acknowledged as
being produced from such unions. Susan Treggiari, in her study of concubinage, could find evidence among the inscriptions she studied that only three

19. CORA LUTZ, MUSONIUS RUFUS: THE ROMAN SOCRATES 89 (1947); Some Stoics also advocated the development of a strong bond between parents and offspring. Thus, one often finds
Stoic writers arguing on behalf of maternal breast-feeding of children, against the Roman custom
of sending children out to wet-nurses. See GRETCHEN REYDAMS-SCHILS, THE ROMAN STOICS:
SELF, RESPONSIBILITY, AND AFFECTION 126–28 (2005).
20. Thomas A.J. McGinn, Concubinage and the Lex Iulia on Adultery, 121 TRANSACTIONS
OF THE AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS’N 335, 338 (1991).
21. Beryl Rawson, Roman Concubinage and Other De Facto Marriages, 104 TRANSACTIONS
OF THE AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS’N 279, 304 (1974).
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couples had children.22 Marriage, it seems, was considered by all involved
to be the proper venue for the raising of children.23
Procreation, of course, was not an absolute ideal in pre-Christian
Rome. Throughout the history of pre-Christian Rome, the paterfamilias—
the head of the household—retained the power of life and death over infants born into his family. The odious practice of exposure thus remained a
regular feature of pre-Christian life. One has a sense of how deeply entrenched this practice must have been when one reads a document like Seneca the Younger’s De Ira. Well regarded by many modern readers for his
humaneness, Seneca spoke warmly about the need to destroy “weak and
deformed” (debiles monstrosique) children.24 Addressing the general need
to avoid anger, Seneca opined that we are sometimes called to perform violent acts, but we must nevertheless retain our composure even under these
circumstances. We must beat rabid dogs to death.25 We kill wild oxen and
slay sickly sheep lest they infect the entire flock. Just so, we “extinguish”
(enxstinguimus) unnatural offspring and drown sick children. We do these
things, Seneca counseled his reader, not from a heart filled with rage, but
moved by reason and the rightful desire to remove the “useless” (inutilia)
from the healthy and the sound. Seneca’s concern was not with the moral
problems associated with the taking of human life, but rather with encouraging that such unpleasant tasks be carried out with equanimity and the
assurance that they are in accord with reason.26
If the procreative ideal did not trump the paternal power to expose
unwanted young, neither could it serve to open up the institution of marriage to those who were legally excluded from it. As alluded to above,
slaves were excluded from the possibility of marriage, although they were
allowed to form stable if not entirely permanent relations under the rubric
of contubernia.27 Realizing the utility in promoting affectionate relations
22. Susan Treggiari, Concubinae, 49 PAPERS OF THE BRIT. SCH. AT ROME 59, 67 (1981).
23. “[M]arriage,” Beryl Rawson concluded, “remained the norm.” Rawson, supra note 21, at
304.
24. SENECA, DE IRA I.XV.2.
25. Id.
26. Exposure was used not only as a means of eliminating children deemed unfit to live on
account of birth defects, but also as a means of limiting family size or of dealing with suspected
cases of infidelity. Mireille Corbier, Child Exposure and Abandonment, in CHILDHOOD, CLASS
AND KIN IN THE ROMAN WORLD 52, 72 (Suzanne Dixon ed., 2001).
27. Adolf Berger defines contubernium as “[a] permanent, marriage-like union between
slaves. Masters favored the maintenance of slave families. Children of such unions were liberi
naturales.” See ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 415 (1953) (Liberi
naturales means “natural children” as opposed to the legitimate children of legally married
couples.). In addition to the status of the children, Buckland notes other consequences of contubernia—because the parties were slaves and hence incapable of marriage, neither could commit
adultery. Slaves were also incapable of inheriting from one another. See W.W. BUCKLAND, THE
ROMAN LAW OF SLAVERY: THE CONDITION OF THE SLAVE IN PRIVATE LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO
JUSTINIAN 76–77 (2000).
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among the persons they owned, slave owners often permitted if not encouraged marriage-like unions that frequently produced children.28
Despite these qualifications, however, it is clear that the central organizing principle supporting the Roman conception of marriage was the
idea of procreation. To say that Roman marriage was all about the conservation of property, inheritance strategies, or the transmissibility of estates,
or to observe that it was formed by the free consent of the parties and dissoluble in the same manner it was formed is all beside the point. None of
this is comprehensible without keeping in mind the procreative dimension
of marriage. After all, arrangements regarding property and inheritance only
make sense when there is a succeeding generation to benefit from such
planning. This was emphasized by Emperor Augustus and reiterated by succeeding generations of emperors. It was justified by the Stoic philosophers
and can also be found in Ulpian’s explication of natural law, which teaches
“the joining of male and female that we call marriage, and the procreation
and education of children.”29
II.

THE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE

OF THE

EARLY MIDDLE AGES

Christianity represented a reordering of the way in which marriage was
conceived. Most fundamentally, marriage was no longer seen as the highest
or best life for persons committed to following Christ. Pride of place belonged, rather, to those who, in accord with the “counsels of perfection,”
chose instead to follow a life of perfect continence.30
Virginity had existed as a religiously motivated phenomenon in the
ancient world prior to the rise of Christianity. For example, the ancient
Rome of Emperor Augustus preserved and revered the cult of the Vestal
Virgins who were women selected before attaining puberty from among the
28. [B]ecause slaves were technically not permitted to marry and could thus not produce legally recognisable families, the relationships which are attested in the sources
must be considered concessions to the slaves from their owners: it cannot be imagined,
in light of owners’ omnipotence over their slaves, that servile marriages occurred and
lasted, or that children were born to married slaves, without the connivance if not express permission of [their] masters.
K.R. BRADLEY, SLAVES AND MASTERS IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE: A STUDY IN SOCIAL CONTROL 50
(1984). Establishing the fullness of masters’ control over slaves’ reproductive capabilities, Bradley goes on to note that slave owners frequently sold mothers and children but almost never sold
family groupings that included a husband, wife, and children. Id. at 52–55.
29. JUSTINIAN, DIGEST 1.1.1 § 3 (“hinc descendit maris atque feminae coniunctio, quam nos
matrimonium appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio”).
30. In speaking of the “counsels of perfection,” I am borrowing the classical term for the
three great vows those entering the religious life would customarily undertake—chastity, obedience, and poverty. The classical distinction drawn by generations of scholastic writers was between “counsels,” which one is free to accept or reject, and “precepts,” which one is obliged to
follow. All Christians are obliged to follow the evangelical precepts—the positive commandments
of the Scripture—but are free to accept or reject those admonitions—“counsels”—intended to
help us achieve a high level of perfection. One can still consult productively classic works like
BISHOP CHARLES GAY, THE RELIGIOUS LIFE AND THE VOWS 1–15 (1942) (exploring the differences between the evangelical precepts and the counsels of perfection).
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Roman aristocracy and given the task of serving at the altar of Vesta, the
goddess of the Roman hearth.31 Vestal Virgins played a crucially important
political role in ensuring the health of the state.32 Their continued virginity
symbolized Roman stability, but the loss of virginity consequent upon an
individual’s moral lapse was feared as a threat to the state’s very survival.33
(Vestal Virgins, it should be added, did not maintain a commitment to perpetual virginity but rather were allowed to marry and engage in sexual intercourse late in life, after the possibility of procreation had passed by.)
While the purity of Vestal Virgins was essential to political right order,
their way of life was not intended to represent the Roman ideal. Procreation
remained the fundamental value of family life,34 and Roman religion did
not hold out the Vestal Virgin as a model for emulation or exalt the virgin
to a special place in the afterlife. Peter Brown has captured these ideas well:
“[Vestal Virgins] fitted into a clearly demarcated space in civic society.
Though eminent and admired, they were not thought to stand for human
nature at its peak.”35
The Church Fathers who wrote in the fourth and fifth centuries
changed the premises on which religiously inspired virginity was constructed. They were emphatic on the transcendent significance of the virginal life. Methodius, a Greek writer active around the year 300, argued that
virginity mirrored the divine form of life. It was necessary, on this account,
that Jesus Christ remain virginal and that his life should constitute a pattern
for those who would be perfect: “What then did the Lord, the Truth and the
Light, accomplish on coming down to the world? He preserved His flesh
incorrupt in virginity with which he had adorned it. And so let us too, if we
are to come to the likeness of God, endeavor to banish corruptibility.”36
St. Ambrose, bishop of Milan, doctor of the Church, and teacher of St.
Augustine, stressed the close connection between virginity and the promise
of immortal life. Jesus Christ, by rising from the dead, offered to all the
promise of resurrection of the body and life everlasting in glorified form.
Jesus had also stated that in heaven they neither marry nor are given in
31. On the selection, training, and expectations of Vestal Virgins, see Mary Beard, The Sexual Status of Vestal Virgins, 70 J. ROMAN STUD. 12, 12–27 (1980). Beard has more recently
reconsidered and modified her larger anthropological claims about the sexually ambiguous nature
of the Vestal Virgins. See Mary Beard, Re-reading (Vestal) Virginity, in WOMEN IN ANTIQUITY:
NEW ASSESSMENTS 166–77 (Richard Hawley & Barbara Levick eds., 1995).
32. ARIADNE STAPLES, FROM GOOD GODDESS TO VESTAL VIRGINS: SEX AND CATEGORY IN
ROMAN RELIGION 135 (1998).
33. Id. (“A single lapse by a single priestess threatened the very existence of the state.”). The
sanction for such a lapse was terrifying—burial alive with token amounts of food and drink.
34. Id. at 130.
35. PETER BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY: MEN, WOMEN, AND SEXUAL RENUNCIATION IN
EARLY CHRISTIANITY 8 (1st ed. 1988).
36. ST. METHODIUS, THE SYMPOSIUM: A TREATISE ON CHASTITY 47 (Herbert Musurillo
trans., Longmans, Green & Co. 1958).
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marriage.37 St. Ambrose construed these and other teachings to justify virginity in this life as a foretaste and intimation of the life of the world to
come:
“When the dead rise again there is no marrying or giving in marriage; they are as the angels in heaven are.” He who condemns
virginity condemns our desire for that resurrection. Resurrection
can hardly be counted wrong if it is assigned as the final reward
for mankind; and its likeness, virginity, can hardly be offensive if
its model is approved both by present desire and by future
enjoyment.38
Virginity, St. Ambrose stressed repeatedly, imitates the life of the angels themselves. It is not a naturally occurring phenomenon, and the mind
focused only on the things of this world will not appreciate its foundation in
a transcendent order.39 It is not a practice found among “the nations” (gentilibus) nor among the “barbarians” (barbaris).40 Animals do not practice
virginity.41 “Virginity,” St. Ambrose asserted, “quite rightly looks to
heaven for its manner of life.”42 It is, indeed, a gift from heaven, but one
which can be imitated on Earth by those gifted with grace and filled with a
firm disposition to follow the highest counsels of Christ. St. Ambrose also
contrasted virginity practiced by Christians with the pagan practices of
classical Rome. Vestal Virgins do not take a vow of perpetual continence,
but rather practice chastity only for a few years. They maintain a youthful
integrity only to be corrupted in advanced age.43 St. Ambrose was both
perplexed and dismayed at such a strange practice.
St. Augustine offered a similar theological defense of virginity. There
are many natural duties that arise from our human nature, St. Augustine
wrote, chief among them the requirement that we bring about the next generation. Virginity, however, is something set apart: virginal integrity, practiced through devoted continence, and the consequent freedom from sexual
relations that those under vows enjoy, does not belong to this world; rather,
it is the “angelic portion” (angelica portio)—the form of life led by celestial
beings.44
St. Augustine went so far as to assert that a special place has been
reserved in heaven for those who observe virginal continence. In making
37. Matthew 22:30.
38. ST. AMBROSE, De virginitate, in GIVEN TO LOVE para. 27, at 87 (James Shiel trans.,
Scepter Publishers 1963). St. Ambrose is quoting Matthew 22:30.
39. St. Ambrose, De virginibus, bk. I, 11, 16 PATROLOGIA LATINA 191 (Jacques-Paul Migne
ed., 1844–55).
40. Id. bk. I, 14.
41. Id.
42. Id. bk. I, 14, in GIVEN TO LOVE 21–22 (James Shiel trans., Scepter Publishers 1963).
43. St. Ambrose, De virginibus, supra note 39, bk. I, 15.
44. ST. AUGUSTINE, De sancta virginitate, in DE BONO CONIUGALI, DE SANCTA VIRGINITATE
78, para. 12 (P.G. Walsh ed. & trans., 2001).
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this point, he chose to reflect on the text in the Gospel of Matthew that
compares our eternal reward to the householder who has hired some laborers: Some labor all day long, others for a few hours, and some only for one
hour at the very end of the day. Yet the householder gave to each one a
single denarius as their wage.45
Fearing, perhaps, that this text stood against his contentions, St. Augustine responded:
[E]ternal life will itself be shared alike by all the saints, and so the
denarius has been allotted equally to all. But because in that eternal life the lights of their merits will shine differently, “There are
many dwelling places in the Father’s house.” Accordingly, since
the value of the denarius remains the same, one of us will not live
longer than another, but in those numerous dwelling-places one
will obtain brighter glory than another.46
Virginity thus led to munificent eternal rewards. Even in this life, however, virginity was not to be understood as barrenness. A central feature of
the case made on behalf of virginity was its procreative capacity. This was
not procreation in a terrestrial, physical sense. Virginity, rather, was rich
with the possibility of reproduction in a deeply transcendent, spiritual sense.
By its witness to the perfection of human life in God, it won souls for the
Church.
St. Augustine stressed that there were two kinds of birth: physical birth
and spiritual birth. The latter was the more important since what mattered in
this life was our salvation—our acceptance into the kingdom of God at the
end of our days. Virgins were the ones responsible for the spiritual birth of
souls within the Church; through the perfect lives they led, they modeled
for the rest of us the way to salvation. They are, St. Augustine writes, “both
virgins and mothers of Christ in the faith” (virgines matresque Christi sunt
in fide).47 They may have renounced the possibility of bearing children
physically, but their cooperation in the birth of Christians to eternal life was
indispensable to the survival and success of the faith.48 Virginity was a
form of motherhood—indeed, the highest form of motherhood—by which
all are brought home to God’s mansions.
St. Ambrose made similar claims for virginity. Jesus Christ was both
born of a virgin and has taken as his bride the virgin Church.49 Mary’s
marriage with Joseph, though virginal, was uniquely fecund. Similarly,
Christ’s marriage to the Church has produced nothing less than salvation for
all humankind.50 Those who take a vow of virginity under the Church’s
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Matthew 20:1–16.
ST. AUGUSTINE, De sancta virginitate, supra note 44, at 101.
See id. at 78, para. 7. Translation is author’s own.
Id.
St. Ambrose, De virginibus, supra note 39, paras. 21–22.
Id.
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supervising authority have themselves agreed to take Christ as their spouse
and they share in Christ’s fruitfulness.
In making these claims for virginity, the theologians of the fourth and
fifth century exalted the ideal of fecundity to a spiritual plane. They did not
reject marriage; indeed, as will become clear, they viewed marriage as a
great good. Rather, they made use of the image of a sound and fruitful
marriage to explain the religious significance of virginity: Mary and Joseph
enjoyed a virginal but fruitful relationship. Indeed, the fruit of their marriage brought salvation to the world. Christ enjoys the same sort of relationship with the Church; indeed, Christ is considered the Church’s
bridegroom. Extending the analogy, virgins were understood to have entered into a relationship with Christ and the Church that will win converts
for Christ and thereby give birth to the next generation of Christians. Virgins have thus married Christ in a special way and can expect their unions
to be fruitful. In this way, not only virginity, but also marriage, acquired
institutional strength.
Not surprisingly, the fourth- and fifth-century theologians also explained and explored carnal marriage in terms of its fecundity. One might
consider in particular the writing of St. Augustine, whose theology of the
“goods of marriage” deeply influenced not only the shape of Christian doctrine but the concept of marriage as it was understood by secular lawyers
until very nearly our own day.51
These goods of marriage were threefold: procreation, fidelity, and sacramental unity.52 Connecting the three goods into a single unity was the role
of friendship between the parties. All persons, male or female, St. Augustine wrote, are members of the same human race and are capable of friendship.53 God created all persons from one archetype—Adam—so as to
enhance our natural capacity for friendship.54 And marriage, which represented the natural unity that should prevail between man and woman, joins
the couple together in unity and friendship.55 Indeed, this friendship is so
tight and so all-encompassing that it has caused some scholars to argue that

51. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Augustinian Goods of Marriage: The Disappearing Cornerstone of the American Law of Marriage, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 449 (2003).
52. Id. at 455.
53. ST. AUGUSTINE, De bono coniugali, supra note 44, at 2–3, para. 1.1.
54. Id.
55. Id. It has been observed that friendship is a fundamental organizing principle of St. Augustine’s thought regarding human relations. “[F]riendship, sustained over time, brings such a
rich, deep intimacy and unity to the friends that the friends become one in spirit and soul.” PAUL J.
WADELL, BECOMING FRIENDS: WORSHIP, JUSTICE, AND THE PRACTICE OF CHRISTIAN FRIENDSHIP
86 (2002). St. Augustine was borrowing from classical models in his analysis of friendship, but
applied these classical models in startlingly new ways to the relationship between the spouses that
is marriage.
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there is a structural unity to St. Augustine’s goods of marriage that can be
usefully compared to the Trinity.56
We shall concentrate on one of these goods—the good of procreation.
For St. Augustine, sexual passions were inherently unruly and needed firm
guidance and control. Marriage provided both the sole and proper outlet for
sexual urges and also channeled human sexuality toward the fulfillment of a
great social need—the reproduction of the next generation.57 Especially
when we are young, he stressed, we “burn with the passion of the flesh”
(aestuat concupiscentia carnis).58 Childbirth, the requirement that we look
after the welfare of our children, places a brake on our ardor. As St. Augustine put it, “parental affection tempers [concupiscence].”59
Affirmatively, St. Augustine made the case that all marriages must be
open to the possibility of children. This was so even among elderly couples
who were not expected to have children and married principally to give
each other companionship in old age.60 St. Augustine added, however, that
one did not need to marry out of an express desire to have children: a
couple might therefore marry solely for the purpose of sexual satisfaction.
So long as the two agreed to remain together until death and did not affirmatively take steps to frustrate procreation, their union can legitimately be
called “marriage.”61 Their sexual intimacy might exceed proper limits, but,
so long as they were married, they sinned only venially, and their offense
was pardoned by reason of their marriage.62 In this way, St. Augustine drew
an unbreakable connection between procreation and marriage. St. Augustine made this case both affirmatively, by insisting that openness to procreation be a feature of every marriage, and negatively, by stressing that couples
may not exclude the possibility of children from their union. A couple, St.
Augustine taught, must not actively avoid procreation, nor should they
make use of “some evil means” (opere aliquo malo) to frustrate childbirth.63 “I do not see how we can call such a thing a marriage,” St. Augustine wrote dismissively.64
Like the pre-Christian Romans, St. Augustine did not view procreation
as an absolute value. Permanence in marriage, like procreation, was one of
the fundamental goods. St. Augustine stressed that one could not abandon a
56. See Perry J. Cahall, The Trinitarian Structure of St. Augustine’s Good of Marriage, 34
AUGUSTINIAN STUD. 223 (2003).
57. ST. AUGUSTINE, DE BONO CONIUGALI, supra note 44, at 7–9, III.3.
58. Id. at 8.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 8, III.3.
61. Id. at 11, V.5.
62. ST. AUGUSTINE, DE BONO CONIUGALI, supra note 44, at 11, V.5.
63. Id. at 10–11.
64. See id. at 10 (“non invenio quemadmodum has nuptias appellare possimus”). The word
quemadmodum carries intensifying force when used in the sort of question St. Augustine has
posed. I have used the word “thing” to carry this force. One might also more colloquially translate
the passage as: “I do not know how in the devil we can call this marriage.”
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marriage that had failed to produce offspring in order to move to another
one that held out the promise of procreation.65 Similarly, St. Augustine
counseled that even married couples should consider sexual abstinence, although he stressed that it was mandatory that such a decision be mutual.66
He made it clear that he did not value a high birth rate for its own sake.67
What mattered, rather, was the number of new inhabitants in the spiritual
City of God.
Despite these qualifications to the good of procreation, it should be
obvious that procreation was a fundamental organizing principle for Augustine’s analysis of the marital relationship. It was this principle that allowed
not only his marital theory but also his concept of sacred virginity to cohere
logically. Fecundity in a real and physical sense was a principal justification
for marriage, and fecundity in an extended, spiritual sense was a key justification for virginity.
St. Augustine’s basic framework for analyzing marriage would prove
to be enduring. A millennium and a half after St. Augustine wrote and
flourished, one can still find early American lawyers analyzing marriage in
terms of the Augustinian goods, even when Augustine’s name is never invoked.68 There were, of course, multiple lines of transmission between the
fifth and nineteenth centuries. I would like to consider briefly one such
line—the Irish penitential literature of the early Middle Ages (roughly the
seventh through ninth centuries). This line of transmission represents perhaps the logic of the procreative ideal taken to its most extreme form in the
history of the West.
The penitential literature of Ireland was a product of a Church whose
view of the world was shaped by an Irish monastic culture that observed an
extreme asceticism.69 The goal was nothing less than triumphant spiritual
warfare against the devil.70 Seen in this light, it was natural for the Irish
monastics to teach an austere and demanding sexual ethic. Taming the
desires of the flesh was a means of combating Satan and a sign of his ultimate defeat. An austere sexual ethic, inculcated in the population at large,
was thus nothing more than an extension of the spiritual warfare and selfdenial of monastic existence.
65. Id. at 16–17, VII.7.
66. Id. at 14–15, VI.6–VII.6.
67. Id. at 21–23.
68. Reid, supra note 51, at 459–70.
69. Dáibhı́ Ó Crónı́n has written about St. Columbanus, one of the greatest of the Irish
monks, and his Rule for the monastic settlement he established on the Continent at Luxeuil: “[It
prescribed] a harsh and unremittingly severe existence for the monks with no concessions to the
frailties of body and soul. ‘Let him come weary to his bed and sleep walking, and let him be
forced to rise while his sleep is not yet finished.’” DÁIBHÍ Ó CRÓNÍN, EARLY MEDIEVAL IRELAND,
400–1200, at 197 (1995) (quoting the Rule of St. Columbanus).
70. “The founding fathers of Irish monasticism . . . appealed to the native bellicose instinct of
the Irish and sought to transform it into the service of Christian ideals.” HUGH CONNOLLY, THE
IRISH PENITENTIALS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE TODAY 9 (1995).
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The monastic authors of the penitentials had a keen sense of the many
ways one might sin sexually. “Sexual offenses constituted the largest single
category of behavior that the penitentials treated.”71 This suspicion of
human sexuality fueled the penitentials’ effort to minimize the possibility of
sexual intercourse even among laypersons. With a single-minded logic and
intensity, the penitentials insisted that sexual relations between persons
could take place only within marriage and then only for the sake of
procreation.72
One might briefly consider some leading penitential texts. The Penitential of Finnian declared as a general rule that “marriage is to be continent,” although it permitted couples to have sexual relations, not to satisfy
lustful desires, but for the sake of children.73 Driving the point home, the
Penitential added that where it was clear that a wife was sterile, the parties
should practice continence “until God passes true and just judgment” upon
them.74 In more abbreviated form, this rule is repeated in the Penitential of
Cummean.75
The penitentials made the point that sexual intercourse was solely for
procreation through other, less extreme, rules as well. Thus it was frequently legislated that married men and women should refrain from sexual
intercourse after the woman learned that she was pregnant.76 The penitentials also generally forbade sexual contact with a woman during her menstrual periods, but this prohibition seems to have been motivated largely out
of concerns over ritual impurity.77
As with the other sources that have been considered, procreation was
not the ultimate value before which all other rules were subordinated. Like
St. Augustine, the penitential writers stressed that one could not abandon
one’s spouse and move to another for the sake of procreation. Indeed, as
noted above, the penitential writers insisted upon mutual continence in such
circumstances.78 And the penitential writers also prescribed long periods of
time, corresponding to periods in the Church calendar, during which
couples were expected to refrain from intercourse. These periods included
Lent, Advent, and a period of time following the feast of Pentecost.79 During these times, couples were expected to be preoccupied with the things of
the next world, not the sordid affairs of our shattered and sinful universe.
71. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 153
(1987).
72. PIERRE PAYER, SEX AND THE PENITENTIALS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SEXUAL CODE,
550-1150, at 115 (1984).
73. THE IRISH PENITENTIALS para. 46, at 90–92 (Ludwig Bieler ed. & trans., 1975).
74. Id. at paras. 41, 88.
75. Id. at paras. 28, 116.
76. See the references collected by BRUNDAGE, supra note 71, at 156.
77. Id. at 155–56.
78. Supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
79. BRUNDAGE, supra note 71, at 158.
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But with these exceptions, it is clear that procreation was a central organizing principle of the penitential literature. This collection of norms and principles, teachings and expectations in turn “helped shape the mentality, the
ethic, of western Europe.”80
III.

SACRED SEX, THE GOOD OF CHILDREN, AND MARITAL PERMANENCE:
THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS IN THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES

The early Middle Ages were a time of chaos. Kingdoms and principalities rose and fell with dreary regularity. Even the papacy became the plaything of the competing dynastic interests of the leading families of central
Italy. It is fair to describe the period of the fifth through eleventh centuries
as a time of widespread institutional failure. Christian sensibilities gradually
gained a foothold among the Germanic tribes that settled Western Europe
following the fall of the Roman Empire, but the Christianization of Europe
was a gradual process, accomplished in fits and starts amidst a great deal of
political and social turmoil.
By the end of the eleventh century, however, a certain stability was
achieved. The papacy, thanks to the great reform movement led by the likes
of Nicholas II and Gregory VII, established itself as an independent, effective, and powerful player on the European stage.81 Indeed, the Church took
on the trappings of a transnational state, with papal representatives (legates)
and courts in every country. The nation-states of Europe also took their first
fledgling steps toward consolidation, much of it accomplished through the
adoption of systematized law codes. Universities, whose purposes were to
inquire into fundamental issues of philosophy, theology, and law, arose
throughout Europe.82
A major line of inquiry among the scholastic writers who peopled the
faculties of the new universities was the nature of the sacraments, including
the sacrament of marriage. In a previous paper, I explored the question of
the marital rights of non-Christians.83 That paper considered the sacramental theology of early scholastic writers like Hugh of St. Victor and Anselm
of Laon who asserted that it was possible that Christians and non-Christians
alike enjoyed marital rights deserving of at least some respect at law. The
next several paragraphs will build on these earlier findings to consider “sacred sex”: the sacral dimension of the sex act in symbolizing the sacramental nature of marriage.
80. NOONAN, supra note 12, at 153.
81. For a good review of these developments, see generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION: THE MAKING OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
82. For a classic treatment of the rise of the universities, see generally HASTINGS RASHDALL,
THE UNIVERSITIES OF EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES (F.M. Powicke & A.B. Emden eds., 1936).
83. Charles J. Reid, Jr., Toward an Understanding of Medieval Universal Rights: The Marital Rights of Non-Christians in Early Scholastic and Canonistic Writings, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV.
95 (2005).
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In the twelfth century it became established among canon lawyers and
theologians that consent made a marriage while consummation conferred on
a Christian marriage a special firmness.84 In essence, consummation created
a bond that was so tight that no earthly power could dissolve it.85 But what
was it about consummation that gave it such power? That is the question
that shall next be considered.
The term “sacrament” (sacramentum) carried a variety of nontheological meanings. It carried the sense of an oath taken in judicial proceedings,
as well as the oath taken upon entry into the military.86 By extension, it
conveyed the sense of a solemn undertaking87 or the rites of initiation into a
secret society.88 The term was eventually taken up by Christian writers who
imparted to it a technical, theological meaning. In early theological writing,
sacramentum could carry the meaning of a theological mystery, such as the
Incarnation.89 It could also convey the sense of an outward sign of some
sacred thing.90 Finally, it might simply mean some visible sign of God’s
presence in the world.91
St. Augustine made extensive use of the term in this final sense. “Sacraments, to St. Augustine, were signs of God’s presence and promise in the
world, of His gifts to His creation, and of salvation through His Word.”92 A
wide variety of events, natural phenomena, and human actions could convey the divine presence—everything from gestures of reverence, the liturgical calendar, or prayers for mercy.93
This broad Augustinian understanding of the word sacrament continued to influence writers in the twelfth century, although one sees in this
latter period a sustained—and ultimately successful—effort to confine its
technical meaning to efficacious signs that were understood to confer grace
upon the believers who made use of them. During the twelfth century, the
Latin word sacramentum was narrowed and given greater precision—it
now signified not any sign of God’s presence but, as the formula put it, “a
sign of some sacred thing.”94 It also came to represent a channel by which
believers might come to acquire the grace necessary for salvation.
84. James Brundage traces this idea to the work of the twelfth-century canonist Gratian. See
BRUNDAGE, supra note 71, at 235–42.
85. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., POWER TO DISSOLVE: LAWYERS AND MARRIAGES IN THE COURTS
OF THE ROMAN CURIA 81–82 (1972).
86. OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1674–75.
87. Id. at 1675.
88. Id.
89. CHARLES DU CANGE, GLOSSARIUM MEDIAE ET INFIMAE LATINITATIS 257 (Léopold Favre
ed., 1886).
90. Id.
91. Reid, supra note 83, at 103.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. SEAMUS P. HEANEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SACRAMENTALITY OF MARRIAGE FROM
ANSELM OF LAON TO THOMAS AQUINAS 3 (1963).
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We are concerned in particular with the symbolism that came to be
associated with marriage. What was it about marriage that signaled and represented the divine? What was uniquely sacred to marriage that elevated it
to the level of a sacrament, not in the old Augustinian sense, but in the
newer, more restricted, scholastic understanding of a grace-conferring, efficacious symbol? To answer this question will require us to examine the
symbolic significance of the sex act, and in particular, the act of consummating a union.
Let us consider some of the scholastic treatises of the early and middle
twelfth century. This period includes the first formative writings of the
scholastic theology that would become the foundation of the Catholic
Church’s understanding of God and the sacraments for centuries to come.
At the very beginning of this period, the anonymous treatise Deus de cuius
principio et fine tacetur sought to compare and contrast the marriages of
Christians and non-Christians.95 All marriages have this much in common,
the author asserted: parties enter into them to avoid fornication.96 But consummated Christian marriages add to this minimalist understanding a symbolic significance: they reveal a fundamental truth about the relationship of
Christ and His Church. This truth is revealed by the joining of the parties:
Christ has married His Church and has become one body with the Church in
the same way that a man becomes one body with his wife.97
Honorius of Autun, active in the first half of the twelfth century, wrote
a large number of works including the Elucidarium, intended as a summary
of Catholic theology put in dialogue format. In the course of his dialogue,
his interlocutors ask why it is impossible for close relatives to marry one
another.98 The answer, Honorius suggested, lay in the sacramental nature of
marriage: earthly marriage among Christians represents the transcendent
union of Christ and the Church. Jesus Christ and the Church are of different
natures—divine and human—but have come together to form a single unbreakable body. So also, male and female should be of different natures—
they should come from different bloodlines (parentelae) in order to represent the union of the divine and the human, that is, the joining together
of Christ and His Church.99 As Seamus Heaney put it in his analysis of this

95. This text appears as Le recueil des sentences ‘Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur’ et
son remaniement, in 5 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ANCIENNE ET MÉDIÉVALE 245–74 (H. Weisweiler ed., 1933).
96. Id. at 272–73.
97. Id. at 273 (“Nam nuptias Christi et ecclesie significat, quia Christus et ecclesia unum
corpus sunt. Christus tamen preest et regit. Sic vir cum sit unum corpus cum uxore . . . tamen
preest ei et regit . . . [T]alis coniunctio dicitur sanctitas sacramenti.”); cf. HEANEY, supra note 94,
at 6.
98. 172 HONORIUS OF AUTUN, ELUCIDARIUM, PATROLOGIA LATINA 1147 (n.d.).
99. Id.
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text, “It is clearly not the state of marriage which is the sacrament, but the
sexual union.”100
A twelfth-century Bible commentary went into even greater detail:
“The copulation of male and female is said to be a great sacrament,” containing in itself Christ and the Church.101 Marriage, the author repeated for
emphasis, represents the joining of Christ and his Church. Paraphrasing
Scripture, the author noted that just as a man leaves his mother and father to
join himself to his wife, so Jesus left his mother and father to join his
bride—the Church.102 When we marry, furthermore, we partake in the virtues that Christ displayed in his earthly ministry.103 Marriage is thus a
means of achieving personal sanctity as well as symbolizing Christ’s
salvific love for all humankind.
Rufinus, author of an important early commentary on Gratian’s
Decretum, the founding document of the systematic study of canon law,
accepted the framework laid down by the theologians.104 There were,
Rufinus asserted, really two sacraments of marriage. The first, which represented the soul’s union with God, consisted of the exchange of consent to
marry—even before consummation.105 But the relationship of the soul to
God is inherently unstable—people fall into heresy or apostasy every day.
Something more was needed, and that was consummation. Consummation,
Rufinus asserted, has within itself the whole symbolism of Christ and his
Church.106 The Church and Christ enjoyed a relationship that was unbreakable, and consummation permitted human persons to represent that transcendent relationship in their own marital relations.
In this way, theologians and canonists developed the positive attributes
of human sexuality within marriage. Sexual intercourse was no longer
seen—as it had been understood in the Penitentials—as a narrow concession in a relationship that should normally be governed by continence. Indeed, in the writings of these twelfth-century thinkers, intercourse became a
necessary feature of the symbolism of Christian marriage and was necessary to give marriage its sacramental stability and unity. Christ and the
Church had forged an unbreakable bond of different but compatible natures;
so also do man and woman at the time they consummate their union. Consummation, and the joining of bodies that thereby occurred, was a sign
100. HEANEY, supra note 94, at 9.
101. ARTUR LANDGRAF, COMMENTARIUS CANTABRIGIENSIS IN EPISTOLAS PAULI E SCHOLA PETRI ABELARDI: 2. IN EPISTOLAM AD CORINTHIOS IAM ET IIAM, AD GALATAS ET AD EPHESIOS 431
(Philip S. Moore ed., University of Notre Dame 1939). “‘Sacramentum’. Hanc copulationem
maris et femine dicit esse sacramentum magnum, in Christo videlicet et ecclesia.” Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. RUFINUS, SUMMA DECRETORUM 442–43 (Heinrich Singer ed., 1963).
105. Id.; cf. Reid, supra note 83, at 116–17.
106. “Quod habeat in se Christi et ecclesiae sacramentum.” RUFINUS, supra note 104, at 443.
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pointing to a sacred reality—the promise of salvation through the mystery
of Christ’s union with His Church.
If sexual relations had in some sense been sanctified, the theologians
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries also had important and original things
to say about other aspects of marriage. In the process, they made it clear
that marriage served the fundamental good of procreation. They built up a
set of rules and doctrines that ensured that, ordinarily, marriages should be
directed toward this great social good. In particular, the scholastic writers
came to articulate the Augustinian goods of marriage in terms that would
support the proposition that marriage existed to serve procreative ends.
Peter Lombard (c. 1100–c. 1161) was the most influential of these
early theological writers. A professor at the University of Paris, Peter’s
work would prove to be of enduring significance to the intellectual life of
the Church. His Sentences became the foundational text of subsequent scholastic writing through the remainder of the Middle Ages—all doctoral candidates in theology were expected to write a dissertation on the
Sentences.107 His understanding of the sacraments as seven outward manifestations of sacred things that not only symbolize divine reality but confer
grace on those who partake in them would become generally accepted by
the Church and canonized as ecclesiastical doctrine at the Council of Trent
in the sixteenth century.108
With this as background, one can consider Peter’s treatment of the
Augustinian goods of marriage. Peter, like the other medieval writers who
have been reviewed, made productive use of St. Augustine where he was
able to do so. He commenced his analysis of marriage by noting that sexual
relations were a duty incumbent on persons even before the Fall: while
Adam and Eve were still in Paradise, God enjoined on them the duty “to
increase and multiply.”109 Citing St. Augustine as support, Peter continued:
When Adam and Eve sinned, they brought sin into the world and marriage
assumed a double aspect. It was both a duty upon those able to use it properly and a remedy for those who suffered from illness (aegrotis), by which
Peter meant clearly disordered human sexual urges.110 By providing a
proper outlet for these impulses, marriage furnished a means by which to
107. On the gradual acceptance of Peter Lombard’s text as foundational to medieval theology,
see Nancy Spatz, Approaches and Attitudes to a New Theology Textbook: The Sentences of Peter
Lombard, in THE INTELLECTUAL CLIMATE OF THE EARLY UNIVERSITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF OTTO
GRÜNDLER 27, 27–52 (Nancy Van Deusen ed., 1997).
108. For further information on Peter Lombard and the sacrament of marriage, see 2 MARCIA
COLISH, PETER LOMBARD 628–98 (1994), and compare Charles J. Reid, Jr., Marriage in the Western Legal Tradition: A Product of Natural Law or a Creature of the State?, in FAMILY IN THE
THIRD MILLENNIUM: SELECTED SCHOLARSHIP SUBMITTED TO THE DOHA CONFERENCE ON MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY (2007).
109. PETER LOMBARD, SENTENTIARUM LIBRI QUATUOR 656 (Paris 1892).
110. Id.
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direct them to a good purpose.111 Attacking those whom he labeled heretics,
Peter defended marriage as something that had been blessed twice by
God—at the creation of the world and again by Jesus at the marriage feast
at Cana.112 Marriage, he concluded, is therefore a sacrament, a sacred symbol, and a channel of divine grace.113
Following what was rapidly becoming the received scholastic tradition, Peter asserted that it was consummation that constituted the visible
sacramental sign of marriage, signifying the union of Christ and the
Church.114 The consent that persons exchange in order to bring about marriage, Peter asserted, signifies the spiritual union of Christ and the Church,
while the physical coupling of bodies represented the joining of human and
divine natures in the Church.115
Peter in particular developed the significance of the Augustinian
goods. Where the “three goods” have not been made part of the marriage
contract, there is no marriage.116 Regarding the good of children, Peter acknowledged that it was impossible to expect every married couple to have
children. A couple might have chosen to renounce the conjugal debt, or
they may be aged or infertile.117 But so long as they do not exclude the
“hope of children” (prolis spes), they contract marriage validly.118 Peter
condemned both the use of “poisons of sterility” (the standard medieval
term for contraceptives) and recourse to abortion as destructive of the good
of children.119
Finally, St. Bonaventure, the thirteenth-century Franciscan theologian,120 drew connections between fidelity and sacramental stability, on the
one hand, and the good of children, on the other. In a disputation meant to
respond to those who defended the concubinage of the ancient world, St.
Bonaventure declared that the good of children was thereby offended.121
“Right reason,” St. Bonaventure argued, taught that a married couple is
made “one flesh.” Their coming together is a kind of exercise of “genera111. Id.
112. Colish tends to read Peter as presenting a more optimistic account of marital sexuality
than St. Augustine, especially in discussing sexual relations undertaken to prevent fornication.
Where St. Augustine saw such relations as at least venially sinful, Colish notes that Peter Lombard
understood “this type of sex in marriage not as a means of preventing sin but as a means of
strengthening the couple’s mutual commitment.” COLISH, supra note 108, at 661.
113. Id. at 657.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 673.
117. Id.
118. COLISH, supra note 108, at 657.
119. Id.
120. St. Bonaventure (1221–1274), along with St. Thomas Aquinas, was one of the giants of
thirteenth-century theology. He was a colleague of Thomas Aquinas at the University of Paris and
authored a large number of theological treatises.
121. St. Bonaventure, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, in OPERA OMNIA 747
(1889).
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tive power” (vis generativa).122 This much, however, St. Bonaventure conceded, was true of any sexual relationship, even of those engaged in
concubinage. He made this last point not in order to denigrate marriage but
in order to stress that marriage was the divinely appointed means of achieving the procreation and education of the next generation. Because of the
importance of sexual relations to procreation, St. Bonaventure believed two
conclusions followed from his argument—all extramarital sexual relations
were illicit; and, within marriage, the goods of sacramental unity and permanence served to effectuate the good of procreation.
Thus if a man and wife have children, “both parents” (parentes ambo)
are required to see to the education of their children.123 When the parents
age and can no longer care for themselves, children must see to their parents’ needs. Concubinage shatters these obligations and expectations. Parents, especially fathers, will not be attentive to their children, preferring
instead the attention of their paramours; and children will neglect their parents’ needs. Indeed, parentage itself would be made uncertain. It is always
possible that a man will have a child by his concubine. Mingling the sublime with the intensely practical, St. Bonaventure noted that such a possibility shattered the natural order of marriage by gravely disrupting its
sacramental stability, and by overturning the father’s carefully contrived
estate planning.124
What is significant for our purposes in this argument is the way in
which St. Bonaventure has connected procreation with the other Augustinian goods. He has effectively united them in the course of his argument and
thereby made procreation the chief bulwark against claims that concubinage
should be permitted. Procreation has become the great social end toward
which marriage is directed. To be sure, sacramental unity served as a symbol of Christ’s unbreakable union, but it also ensured the proper rearing of
children; the same might also be said for permanence. Thus, these other
Augustinian goods are now seen not only as good in their own right but as a
means of facilitating this larger end of procreation.
IV. ENGLISH THEOLOGY

AND

LAW: THE FRUITFUL MARRIAGE

The Act of Supremacy of 1534, by which Henry VIII declared himself
head of both church and state in England and broke off ecclesiastical allegiance to Rome, was one of the great transformative events in the history of
the European Church (not to mention the modern unitary state).125 By the
terms of the Act, King Henry VIII henceforth became entitled to “enjoy,
annexed and united to the imperial crown of this realm . . . all honours,
122.
123.
124.
125.
177–79

Id.
Id.
Id.
MARK A. NOLL, TURNING POINTS: DECISIVE MOMENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY
(2d ed. 2000).
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dignities, pre-eminences, jurisdictions, privileges, authorities, immunities,
profits, and commodities” previously belonging to the Roman pontiff in
England.126
Significant for our purposes was the claim over the jurisdictions and
authorities exercised by the Roman pontiff. Henceforward, there could be
no appeal of marriage cases to Rome. Rather, the law of marriage and all
that belonged to it—divorce, annulment, child support, sexual crimes—belonged to the English ecclesiastical courts whose supreme head was the
English monarch. The ecclesiastical courts would retain their jurisdiction
over matrimonial causes until the mid-nineteenth century.127 However, in
spite of new jurisdictional lines of authority, English canon law held tenaciously to the law of the medieval Catholic Church in many respects.128
While English canon law maintained fidelity to its medieval roots, the
Protestant Reformation led to the introduction of some fundamental
changes in the theology of marriage. The idea that marriage was a sacrament, instituted by Christ during His earthly ministry and conferring grace
upon His followers, was rejected in favor of conception of marriage as a
sacramental—a holy estate implanted in nature by God to channel the
human person’s reproductive urges and to assist all who partake in it.129
Marriage was a great social good and it continued to retain a spiritual dimension, but it ceased to be described as a grace-conferring sign and symbol of Christ’s union with the Church. Thus, John Witte has argued
persuasively that the English reformers of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries successfully replaced the Catholic conception of marriage as a
sacrament with a new conception of marriage as a “commonwealth,” an
entity that served “the common good—of the couple, the children, the
church, and the state.”130 Finally, the connection between virginity and
marriage—indeed, the whole theology of virginity that had grown up since

126. Id. at 178 (quoting the Act of Supremacy).
127. In 1857, Parliament enacted a law greatly simplifying the procedures to be used in obtaining a divorce and removing the ecclesiastical courts from the process. Prior to 1857, a petitioner had to obtain a divorce a mensa et thoro (from bed and board) from an ecclesiastical court
and subsequently petition Parliament for approval to remarry. The 1857 Act moved to the secular
courts the power to grant divorce with the right to remarry. See STEPHEN CRETNEY, FAMILY LAW
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 161–62 (2003); Sybil Wolfram, Divorce in England, 1700–1857, 5
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155, 155–86 (1985); Margaret K. Woodhouse, The Marriage and Divorce Bill of 1857, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 260, 260–75 (1959).
128. Richard Helmholz states that “[t]he law of marriage presents the paradoxical case in
which the English Church clung to a part of the medieval Roman canon law which the Roman
Catholic Church itself discarded.” RICHARD H. HELMHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW IN REFORMATION
ENGLAND 69 (1990). Helmholz is specifically referring to the practice of clandestine marriage,
which was practically abolished by the Council of Trent.
129. E. GARTH MOORE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH CANON LAW 82 (1967).
130. JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN
THE WESTERN TRADITION 131 (1997).
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patristic days—was rejected in favor of a strong Protestant commitment to
marriage as the ideal form of Christian life.131
One area of remarkable continuity with the medieval tradition in both
theology and canon law was the centrality of the procreative dimension of
marriage. One might consider theological developments first. The Encyclopedia of Christianity has compared the English Book of Common Prayer to
the Bible in stating that “[a]long with the Bible, it has something of a standard of faith among Anglicans.”132 It was first published in 1549 under the
direction of King Edward VI and revised and republished periodically since
that year.133 In its various editions, it has helped to condition several hundred years of Anglican thought and devotion.
The Prayer Book of 1549 referred back to medieval Catholic theology
in declaring that marriage “signif[ied] unto us the misticall union that is
betwixte Christe and his Church.”134 God, the Prayer Book stressed, had
instituted marriage “in the time of mannes innocencie,” before the Fall from
grace in the Garden of Eden.135 Its importance to humankind was renewed
by Jesus Christ at the wedding feast at Cana.136 Its continued existence was
intended to serve three great ends, the first of which was procreation. The
Prayer Book stated, “Duely considerying the cuases for the whiche matrimonie was ordeined. One cause was the procreation of children, to be
brought up in the feare and nurture of the Lord, and the prayse of God.”137
After pronouncing the couple man and wife, a blessing, adapted from
Psalm 128, was then to be pronounced, stressing the importance of
fruitfulness:
Thy wife shall bee as the fruitful vine, upon the walles of thy
house.
Thy children like the olife braunches rounde about thy table.
Loe, thus shal the man be blessed, that feareth the Lord.
The Lord from out of Sion shall so blesse thee: that thou shalt see
Hierusalem in prosperitie al thy life long.
131. JOHN WITTE, JR., LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: THE LEGAL TEACHINGS OF THE LUTHERAN
REFORMATION 17 (2002). Witte speaks for the entire Protestant Reformation, continental and English, when he states that “[a]ll adult persons, preachers and others alike, should pursue the calling
of marriage, for all were in need of the comforts of marital love and the protection from sexual
sin.” Id.
132. Thaddeus A. Schnitker, Book of Common Prayer, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHRISTIANITY
285 (Erwin Fahlbusch et al. eds., Geoffrey William Bromiley trans., 1999).
133. G.J. CUMING, A HISTORY OF ANGLICAN LITURGY 66–95 (1969) (reviewing the drafting
and promulgation of the first English prayerbook of 1549).
134. CHURCH OF ENGLAND, THE FIRST AND SECOND PRAYER BOOKS OF EDWARD THE SIXTH
252 (1913) [hereinafter THE FIRST AND SECOND PRAYER BOOKS].
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. The other two causes included: marriage as “a remedie agaynst sinne, and to avoide
fornicacion” and marriage for the sake of “the mutuall societie, helpe, and coumfort, that the one
oughte to have of thother, both in prosperitie and adversitie.” Id.

\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-2\UST212.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 24

7-AUG-09

MARRIAGE IN ITS PROCREATIVE DIMENSION

16:04

477

Yea, that thou shalt see thy childers children; and peace be upon
Israel.138
Thus, themes of fecundity, earthly prosperity, and ultimate transcendence
through the survival of the next generation were blended together as a way
of seeking divine favor upon the newly married couple.
The second Prayer Book of Edward VI, promulgated in 1552, proved
to be excessively Protestant for the English public and met ultimate popular
disapproval for this reason.139 This short-lived Prayer Book nevertheless
retained the language reviewed above. Marriage still served first the purpose of procreation,140 and the same blessing was still pronounced.141
When Queen Elizabeth I revived the Book of Common Prayer following
Queen Mary’s short-lived attempt to return the English realm to Catholicism, she removed from the 1552 version its more extreme Protestant elements.142 Elizabeth, however, retained the teachings on marriage. The same
purposes ascribed to marriage in the earlier prayer books, and the same
Psalm pronounced over the married couple, continued to be prescribed by
Elizabeth’s new Prayer Book of 1559.143
The seventeenth century was a time of revolutionary ferment. Puritans,
advocates of an austere Christianity harshly critical of the adornments and
trappings of Anglicanism, gained power in the mid-seventeenth century and
embarked upon a campaign of religious reform intended to purge the vestiges of “popery” from English lands.144 Oliver Cromwell, however, who
had declared himself Lord Protector in the 1650s, governed with a harshness that caused people to yearn for the old royal house. Eventually, with
the death of Cromwell, Charles II, the exiled son of the first King Charles,
was invited back to England in a Restoration of Monarchy. This Restoration
was accompanied by a renewal of Anglican sensibilities, now tempered but
not obliterated by Puritan theology.145
An important exposition of the theological foundations of marriage
and its centrality in the procreation of the next generation was Thomas
138. Id. at 255.
139. The 1552 Prayer Book was quickly rescinded with the accession to the throne of Queen
Mary. When Elizabeth I succeeded Mary, she did not turn to the 1552 Prayer Book but set to work
on a new version. See Schnitker, supra note 132, at 285; see also WILLIAM SYDNOR, THE STORY
OF THE REAL PRAYER BOOK 16–19 (1989).
140. THE FIRST AND SECOND PRAYER BOOKS, supra note 134, at 410.
141. Id. at 413.
142. SYDNOR, supra note 139, at 20–24.
143. CHURCH OF ENGLAND, THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER, 1559: THE ELIZABETHAN
PRAYER BOOK 290–91 (John E. Booty ed., University Press of Virginia 1976) (setting forth the
purposes of marriage); see also id. at 294 (reiterating the Psalm).
144. A good summary of these developments can be found in HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 216–22 (2003).
145. Id. at 222–24, 228–30.
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Comber’s The Occasional Offices of Matrimony.146 Published at the height
of the Restoration, this work set forth—in greater detail than any of the
official documents—the theology behind marriage and childbirth. Rejecting
the Catholic doctrine of the sacramentality of marriage, Comber nevertheless repeated much of the medieval theology used to justify the Catholic
stance. Marriage was “instituted by God the Father, vindicated by God the
son, and explicated by God the Holy Ghoste, to signifie the mysterious
Love of Jesus to his Church; For our Lord forsook his Heavenly Father, and
did cleave to our Nature, becoming one flesh with us.”147
Marriage, Comber continued, was instituted first of all for procreation.148 Comber turned to Jewish theology to stress the transcendent significance of childbirth: Jewish writers, Comber declared, consider the biblical
injunction to be fruitful and multiply “an indispensable precept, affirming
that those who do neglect it, are Murtherers, and shall have no part in the
world to come.”149 Comber acknowledged that Christianity did not hold to
the same position, but even Christians believe that “God designed Marriage
to replenish the world; and therefore all who enter into that estate are bound
to aim principally at the Procreation and Education of Children.”150 In support of this proposition, Comber reviewed a veritable parade of classical
Christian writers—St. Ignatius of Antioch, St. Augustine, and St. Isidore of
Seville, among others.151 He concluded,
[T]hus matrimony becomes the preserver of the world, and the
continuer of Mankind, being a never-failing Foundation which always sends forth new streams . . . And yet still Marriage hath a
higher end than barely to produce Children, for it is designed also
for the Education of Children in the fear and nurture of the Lord,
and to his praise and glory.152
Comber’s commentary on a related Anglican rite, “The Churching of
Women,” also bears analysis. A medieval rite,153 retained by the successive
146. THOMAS COMBER, THE OCCASIONAL OFFICES OF MATRIMONY, VISITATION OF THE SICK,
BURIAL OF THE DEAD, CHURCHING OF WOMEN, AND COMMINATION (1679).
147. Id. at 25–26.
148. Id. at 31–36.
149. Id. at 32.
150. Id. In support of this proposition, Comber looked not only to Christian sources but also to
the Augustan marriage laws reviewed above. Id. at 32–33.
151. COMBER, supra note 146, at 33–34.
152. Id. at 34–35. Comber continues by writing that,
[t]he Parents work is not half done when they have brought Children into this world,
they must feed them and attend them, cloath and instruct them, preserve them from
dangers, warn them against all evil things, and labour to make them truly fear God.
Parents therefore, must not only desire to have Children, but resolve to bring them up
well and vertuously.
Id.
153. On medieval antecedents to the “churching of women” ritual, see JOANNE M. PIERCE,
‘GREEN WOMEN’ AND BLOOD POLLUTION: SOME MEDIEVAL RITUALS FOR THE CHURCHING OF
WOMEN AFTER CHILDBIRTH 191–215 (1999).
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versions of the English Book of Common Prayer,154 this ritual called down
God’s blessings on women who have undergone childbirth. Comber offered
an extended explication of the significance of this rite.155 Concerning the
purpose of the ceremony, Comber wrote,
The Birth of Man is so truly wonderful, that it seems to be designed for a constant demonstration of the Omnipotence of our
Creator; and if the frequency did not abate of our admiration, it
could be esteemed no less than a perpetual miracle. However it is
not a meaner act of God’s power and mercy in it self, because he
often repeats it; and therefore that the number of these Providences may not diminish our sense of their true worth, Holy
Church ordains a publick and solemn acknowledgement by the
Party most concerned; that is, the Woman, who still feels the
bruises of our first Parents most deplorable fall . . . .156
Every childbirth, Comber thus asserted, is sacred; none shall be taken
for granted. Every child is a small miracle revealing divine power and an
event worthy of the most solemn thanksgiving.
As with his citation to Augustus’s marriage legislation,157 Comber
chose to justify Christian celebration by considering pagan wisdom. Galen
is thus quoted as seeing in the birth of a child “the power of its Maker.”158
Comber continued: “And shall not we Christians be as just to our Creator?
Shall we not acknowledge every instance he gives us of this kind? especially since he not only makes us in our Mothers Womb, but brings us also
wonderfully from thence.”159
Anglican theology thus made procreation and education the chief purpose and responsibility of marriage. It was declaimed in the marriage ceremony and celebrated in the recitation of the Psalms that followed. It was
also celebrated in the ritual known as the Churching of Women which was
justified as a thanksgiving for the daily miracle of childbirth. The procreative dimension of marriage was thus advanced in a comprehensive form by
Anglican teaching.
Anglican canon law also stressed the procreative dimension of marriage. Henry Swinburne, the author of a sixteenth-century treatise on marriage contracts, explained that parties become free to consent to marriage at
the age of puberty because that is the age at which God Himself equipped
154. The rite appeared in the 1549 Prayer Book as a rite of purification. It became a rite of
Thanksgiving in the 1552 Prayer Book and remained so characterized through subsequent editions
of the Book of Common Prayer. See DAVID CRESSY, PURIFICATION, THANKSGIVING AND THE
CHURCHING OF WOMEN IN POST-REFORMATION ENGLAND 106, 118–19 (1993).
155. COMBER, supra note 146, at 505–38.
156. Id. at 505.
157. See discussion, supra note 150.
158. COMBER, supra note 146 at 512.
159. Id.
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the human person to reproduce.160 A man at the age of fourteen and a woman at the age of twelve “have Natural and Corporal Ability to perform the
duty of Marriage.”161 They have achieved the age at which,
the Lord and Maker of all Creatures in the beginning of the
World, hath by Divine Providence, for the propagation of his
Church, proclaimed an universal Liberty, Crescite et Multiplicamini [Increase and Multiply]. And therefore this Liberty is to be
denied to none, whom otherwise the Almighty hath naturally disposed and enabled to encreate and multiply.162
Elsewhere in his work, Swinburne reiterated and dressed in legal garb
the classic Augustinian argument that the affirmative exclusion of the good
of children resulted in the invalidity of the marriage contract. Swinburne
condemned as contrary to marriage itself the placement in the contract of
certain “unhonest conditions.”163 By this term, Swinburne meant to include
conditions against “the Substance of Matrimony,” which included the three
Augustinian goods: “bonum prolis, bonum fidei, et vinculum individuum—
the good of Issue, the good of Faithfulness, and the Bond inseparable.”164
Such conditions, Swinburne reiterated, were “opposed to those things without which true Matrimony cannot consist.”165 A condition against the good
of children, Swinburne asserted, was especially destructive of the matrimonial contract because the good of children was “the first and principal good
of Matrimony.”166 Echoing his medieval forebears, Swinburne rejected the
claims of those who would point to the marriage of Mary and Joseph as not
a true marriage. To be sure, they did not avail themselves of the marital
rights, but they were open to the possibility of procreation, and the birth of
the Lord Jesus fulfilled the procreative good of marriage.167
Subsequent generations of English canonists expanded upon these
claims. John Ayliffe (1676–1732) echoed the writings of the fourth- and
fifth-century patristic authors in declaring that marriage came into being
even before the Fall for the sake of “the Propagation of Mankind.”168
Neither approving or disapproving of the categories, Ayliffe noted that
“among the papists, there is a threefold matrionial Good, viz., what they in
Latin call Fides, Proles and Sacramentum.”169
160. HENRY SWINBURNE, A TREATISE OF SPOUSALS, OR MATRIMONIAL CONTRACTS 47
(London 2d ed. 1711).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 134.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 135.
166. SWINBURNE, supra note 160, at 135.
167. Id. at 135–36.
168. JOHN AYLIFFE, PARERGON JURIS CANONICI ANGLICANI 359–60 (London 1726).
169. Id. at 360.
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This manner of thinking and talking about marriage persisted into
nineteenth-century English ecclesiastical law. One can consider the work of
Thomas Poynter who published a treatise on marriage and divorce in 1824.
He asked why impotence or frigidity invalidated marital consent. In the
process of resolving this question, he reviewed what the legal tradition had
to say on the subject.170 The eighteenth-century Anglican canonist Thomas
Oughton, Poynter noted, had asserted that impotence and frigidity were
“natural impediments” to marriage because they prevented the parties from
fulfilling the good of children.171 Poynter also looked to the eighteenthcentury continental jurist Samuel Pufendorf for guidance on this subject.
Pufendorf had asked how it was that men and women who were beyond
their reproductive years might be allowed to marry. Pufendorf concluded
that such couples might be considered “as honorary members of the matrimonial state, enjoying a title without an office.”172 Poynter was inclined to
agree with these commentators that procreation must be the central organizing principle of marriage.173
The English Protestant writers tended to emphasize the procreative dimension of marriage to an even greater extent than their medieval forebears.
Medieval Catholic writers, of course, were always required to recognize
virginity as the ideal form of life. They thus moved intellectually back and
forth between the spiritual fecundity of the virgin’s vows to God and the
spouses’ physical fecundity in the here and now. Protestant theology had
largely discarded such a belief in the sanctifying power of virginity. Greater
emphasis was placed on carnal marriage, and its procreative dimension was
thereby expected to carry greater weight.
Thus, in the English ecclesiastical law which would come to form the
backbone of the American law of marriage, procreation remained the central organizing principle. This was the case whether one regarded the principles laid down by generations of theological writers—whose works
informed and guided the work of the English canonists—or whether one
considered the writings of the canonists themselves. A marriage contract
that excluded the good of children contained a dishonest condition that resulted in the contract’s invalidity. A true marriage contained within its
terms the three-fold Augustinian goods of procreation, fidelity, and indissolubility. Natural impediments such as impotence or frigidity, which
served to frustrate procreation, also frustrated the possibility of bringing a
marriage into being. This was the tradition that would inform American
170. THOMAS POYNTER, A CONCISE VIEW OF THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF THE ECCLESIASCOURTS IN DOCTORS COMMONS ON VARIOUS POINTS RELATIVE TO THE SUBJECT OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 123–26 (London, J. & W.T. Clarke 1824).
171. Id. at 123.
172. Id. at 124.
173. Id. at 123–24.
TICAL
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judicial writing on marriage in the nineteenth century and, indeed, for much
of the twentieth century.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
American marriage law continued to reflect these basic presuppositions until well into the twentieth century. Skinner v. Oklahoma, decided by
the United States Supreme Court in 1942, six months after the United States
entered World War II, involved a constitutional challenge to an Oklahoma
law compelling the sterilization of those determined to be habitual
criminals.174 William Orville Douglas, writing for a unanimous court,
opened his opinion by stressing that what was involved was the right to
procreate: “This case touches a sensitive and important area of human
rights. Oklahoma deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic to
the perpetuation of a race—the right to have offspring.”175
In these opening lines, personal rights and public purposes were
linked: procreation was a fundamental human right, but it was also necessary for group survival. Later in the opinion, Douglas drove home the point
that it was within the institution of marriage that this right was to be exercised: “We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race.”176
In 1965, Griswold v. Connecticut, known widely as the case that struck
down legislation outlawing the sale of contraceptives to married persons,
did not repudiate this fundamental purpose to marriage.177 Rather, the Griswold Court understood its decision as protecting and enhancing the marital
relationship. Once again, Justice Douglas—who can hardly be said to have
respected marriage in his private life178—offered a defense of marriage as
“a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred.”179 Justice John Marshall Harlan, in his concurrence, developed the kind of respect the Court continued to harbor for
the institution of marriage. Harlan declared that the Court did not mean by
the decision to depreciate the State’s professed policy behind the statute—
the prevention of “all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relation174. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Habitual criminal for the purposes of the
statute was defined as a person who was convicted of two or more crimes “amounting to felonies
involving moral turpitude.” Id. at 536.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 541.
177. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
178. Douglas was married and divorced several times. One might get a sense of how Douglas
comported himself in his private life by reading chapter thirty-two of Bruce Murphy’s new biography of Douglas, entitled “A Tale of Two Women.” See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE
LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 392–401 (2003).
179. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
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ships.”180 Harlan noted that the Court’s judgment extended only to the prohibition on the sale of contraceptives to married persons. There may be
legitimate reasons, Harlan asserted, for marital use of contraceptives—
whether out of a desire for family planning or out of a concern for the wellbeing and even the lives of those involved.181
Only in the mid-1980s, in the academic reception given to the case of
Turner v. Safley,182 does one see the definitive severing of procreation from
its place of pride as the central organizing principle of American marriage
law.183 Turner v. Safley involved a challenge to prison regulations that prevented inmates from marrying. The Court, in unanimously striking down
the regulations, noted that marriage served not only the purposes of sexual
intimacy and procreation but also acted as a means of providing emotional
or spiritual support for those who might be separated by distance.184 Marriages, the Turner Court added, could serve as outward evidence of ongoing
personal commitment.185 Marriages might even serve as “a pre-condition to
the receipt of government benefits.”186 All of these purposes—all of these
marital goods, to borrow the language of the theologians—were legitimate.
The Turner v. Safley Court did not intend to distinguish among these
various marital purposes, nor did it see these purposes as somehow competing for primacy. The Turner Court, finally, did not view these purposes as
somehow divisible. Indeed, it recognized that in most prison marriages, the
inmate spouse will eventually be released and the union will be “fully consummated.”187 Scholars and courts, however, “have now removed this list
of marital goods from the penological context and relied upon them to argue against the traditional linkage between marriage and heterosexual reproduction.”188 In the process, marriage came to be understood and
explicated as serving the purposes of emotional fulfillment, or even the economic pooling of resources.
180. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 503. Justice Arthur Goldberg, concurring in the Court’s judgment, quoted a prior
Harlan opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551–52 (1961), to emphasize the centrality of
family life to the Griswold Court:
Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity of
property rights. The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life. And the
integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its
protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right. . . . Of
this whole ‘private realm of family life’ it is difficult to imagine what is more private or
intimate than a husband and wife’s marital relations.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
182. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
183. The academic reception given to Turner v. Safley has been traced in Charles J. Reid, Jr.,
The Gingerbread Man Thirty Years On: The Parlous State of Marital Theory, 1 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 656, 677–86 (2003).
184. Turner, 482 U.S. at 95–96.
185. Id. at 95.
186. Id. at 96.
187. Id.
188. Reid, supra note 183, at 683.
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The American same-sex marriage decisions were the beneficiaries of
the nominalistic treatment accorded Turner v. Safley. The Hawaii Supreme
Court’s decision in favor of same-sex marriage, Baehr v. Lewin,189 understood the goods of marriage as chiefly economic in nature. Community
property, spousal support, and access to a variety of state welfare programs
were the goods of marriage, according to Baehr.190
The Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. Vermont191 explicitly rejected
the State’s assertion that its interest in the procreative dimension of marriage precluded it from recognizing same-sex marriage.192 Such a claim, the
court concluded, was both under- and over-inclusive. Many heterosexual
couples marry with no intention of having children, while many homosexual couples would seek to procreate through various artificial means.193
Having diminished the linkage between procreation and marriage, the
Baker court engaged in the same sort of economic reductionism found in
Baehr: inheritance rights, pension and insurance rights, the right to sue for
loss of consortium, and rights of joint tenancy and survivorship. These were
among the fundamental rights and privileges of the marital relationship, according to Baker.194
The Massachusetts case of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health
recognized that marriage served emotional and economic ends.195 The right
to choose whether or not to marry was fundamental because only through
its exercise or nonexercise might one truly have access to “the full range of
human experience and [the] full protection of the laws for one’s ‘avowed
commitment to an intimate and lasting human relationship.’”196 But marriage did not exist solely to further human emotional needs, according to
Goodridge. It also provided access to economic benefits, “touching nearly
every aspect of life and death.”197 Marriage, on this analysis, primarily
served these two ends—the emotional and the economic.
There is a certain radicalism to these decisions. They represent a drastic departure from a western legal tradition that can be traced back to preChristian sources, to the Rome of Emperor Augustus. On the analysis of
Baehr, Baker, and Goodridge, procreation no longer serves as the central
organizing principle of the law. In a sense, then, these cases have ceased to
connect marriage to the natural processes of fecundity and reproduction.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
Id. at 59.
Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
Id. at 881.
Id.
Id. at 883–84.
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
Id. at 957 (quoting Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (1999)).
Id. at 955.
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The central reference point by which not only marriage—but even virginity—was understood in western theology and law has been taken away. One
is left to wonder what comes next.

